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Flores v. State of Nevada, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 72, 120 P.3d 1170 (2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW: EVIDENCE
Summary
Defendant Martha Flores was found guilty of first-degree murder by child abuse
of her five-year-old stepdaughter, Zoraida Flores. Postmortem examinations concluded
that the child had been physically abused and her death was caused by a blunt-force
trauma to the head.
Flores resided with her husband, Jose Flores, his five-year-old daughter Zoraida,
Flores’ daughters and mother and an infant. Flores was the primary caregiver of the
family while Jose worked to support them.
On January 28, 2001, emergency medical personnel responded to the Flores’
apartment and provided assistance to Zoraida. They were unable to resuscitate the child.
The postmortem examination of Zoraida’s body revealed numerous bruises and bite
marks at different stages of healing. The coroner concluded that the death was caused by
blunt trauma to the head.
Flores, in her statement to the police, stated that she found Zoraida that morning
in her bedroom in distress and having trouble breathing. She picked up the child and
found her to be limp and damp, as if she had “wet the bed.” Flores claimed to have taken
Zoraida into the bathroom and attempted to revive her with water from the shower and by
waving rubbing alcohol under her nose. Flores further stated that she went to a neighbor
for help as she did not understand what was wrong with the child and there was no phone
in the apartment. Flores acknowledged that she had in the past tried to cover a bruise
around Zoraida’s eye with make up when out in public, in part to avoid questions from
the police.
Police officers found wet, urine stained children’s clothing and an open bottle of
rubbing alcohol in the apartment. They also observed standing water in the shower and
on the bathroom floor. There was no evidence of blood or physical damage to the shower
or bathroom walls.
The only eyewitness to the incident was Flores’ daughter, Sylvia. Sylvia told
child abuse investigators and her foster mother, Yolanda Diaz, that Flores struck Zoraida
during a struggle in the shower. She said that the blow caused Zoraida to strike her head
and lose consciousness, and Zoraida never woke up.
There was a hearing conducted on the State’s pretrial motion to admit Sylvia’s out
of court statements under N.R.S. 51.315(1).2 At this hearing, Sylvia and Diaz both
testified. The motion was granted with the court finding that Sylvia was unavailable as a
witness based upon her emotional state; she did not wish to discuss the case and it was
obvious that she would not talk about it. The court found strong assurances of the
accuracy of Sylvia’s statements, given their consistency and corroboration by medical
experts. Sylvia did not testify at court.
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This statute states: A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if: (a) its nature and the special
circumstances under which it was made offer strong assurances of accuracy; and (b) the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
2

1

The state introduced Sylvia’s hearsay statements through the testimony of
LVMPD child abuse investigator Sandy Durgin, Child Protective Services investigator
Carolyn Goldman, and Yolanda Diaz. Because Sylvia’s statements were introduced
through surrogates, Flores was not afforded the opportunity of cross examination of
Sylvia.
Durgin testified to Sylvia’s statements that she heard Zoraida crying in the
bathroom and her mother trying to get Zoraida to take a shower. She further stated that
Zoraida was struck by her mother and hit her head on the door. Durgin testified that she
used open ended questions with Sylvia and tried not to influence Sylvia’s statements.
Godman testified to Sylvia’s statements that Zoraida hit Flores on the leg during
an argument and that Flores struck Zoraida causing her to fall to the floor. When Zoraida
did not respond, Flores and Sylvia carried her to a bed. Although the interview was not
optimal, Sylvia did respond with specific information in response to several open ended
inquiries.
Diaz testified to a later spontaneous statement by Sylvia that Zoraida peed in her
pants, that Flores hit her and took her in the shower and hit her. She further stated that
Zoraida slipped and hit her head and that Flores gave her some medicine and she never
wok up.
Flores is seeking reversal of the conviction and a new trial. She is contending that
the district court improperly admitted Sylvia’s hearsay statements in violation of her
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
Under Crawford v. Washington,3 the U. S. Supreme Court held that testimonial
hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify,
and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. This
decision overruled Ohio v. Roberts,4 which allowed the admission of hearsay statements
without the benefit of actual confrontation. The Court did not expressly define
“testimonial” but provided some guidelines. A statement is testimonial if it is (1) an ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross examine, or similar
pretrial statements, (2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial
material such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or confessions, and (3) statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.
In its analysis of Sylvia’s out of court statements the Nevada Supreme court found
that two of the statements were in fact testimonial under the third illustration; the
statements testify to by Durgin and Godman. These statements were made to either
police operatives or someone tasked with reporting instances of child abuse for
prosecution. These circumstances would cause an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.
The third, spontaneous, statement made to Diaz, Sylvia’s foster mother, however,
was found not be one which an objective witness would reasonably anticipate would be
sued for prosecution of a crime.
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541 U.S. 36 (2004).
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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Issue and Disposition
Issue
Whether the trial court’s admission of a child’s out of court testimony a violation
of Flores’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under the 2004 Supreme Court
decision Crawford.
Disposition
Yes. Due to the nature of the child’s out of court statements being testimonial,
the statements’ admissibility violated Flores’ right of confrontation under Crawford. The
Court further found that admission of this evidence was not harmless and therefore
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
Commentary
State of the Law before Flores v. State of Nevada
Prior to the Crawford decision, Ohio v. Roberts5 was the controlling law.
Crawford was decided during the pendency of the appeal in this case. Under Roberts, the
prosecution must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable. The district court may
then admit the hearsay statement if it either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception
or it reflects particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.6 The Nevada Supreme Court
states that under the Roberts test, they would affirm the district court’s decision to allow
admission of the statements.
The concept of “victimless prosecutions” in cases involving child witnesses has
developed nationwide. The United States Supreme Court has addressed this prosecutorial
approach under Roberts wherein surrogates are allowed to testify to out of court
statements made by child witnesses who, because of age or immaturity, might be too
intimidated to testify in court. The Court further advocated this approach when it set
factors to guide the consideration of the trustworthiness of a child witness’s hearsay
statements.7
The Nevada statute, NRS 51.385, is similar to the language under Wright and the
Nevada Supreme Court had previously held the statute constitutional under Roberts and
Wright.8
Other Jurisdictions
Until the Crawford decision in 2004, Roberts had been the controlling case on this
issue of hearsay statements made by child witnesses.
5

448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled in part by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 66.
7
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990). When assessing the trustworthiness of a child witness’s
hearsay statement, the court should consider (1) “spontaneity and consistent repetition, (2) the mental state
of the declarant, (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age, and (4) lack of motive to
fabricate.”
8
Bockting v. State of Nevada, 847 P.2d 1364, 1367-68 (1993).
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Effect of Flores v. State of Nevada
Under Crawford and now this decision, NRS 51.385 is placed into doubt. This
statute deals with statements by underage children concerning sexual or physical abuse of
the child. Additionally, several other Nevada statutes are in doubt to the extent that it
allows testimonial statements to be admitted without affording the defendant the
opportunity to cross examine: NRS 51.325 that deals with former testimony; NRS 51.335
that deals with statements under belief of impending death; NRS 51.345, that deals with
statements against interest; and NRS 513.095 that deals with excited utterances, and NRS
51.385.
Unanswered Questions
The remaining question in this decision, as well as in Crawford, is what
constitutes “testimonial” statements. The Court in Crawford outlines several
“formulations of [a] core class of ‘testimonial’ hearsay,”9 however, it expressly declined
to spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial.10 Trial and appellate courts are
left to make this determination on a case by case basis.
Moreover, these decisions beg the question of whether such strict exclusion of
such statements strikes enough of a balance between a defendant’s right of confrontation
and society’s interest, desire and need to protect children who find themselves in these
horrible situations. Crawford seems to take away the balance that Roberts attempted to
reach between these two tensions and makes the rule very one sided in defendants’ favor.
Conclusion
Under this decision and Crawford, hearsay statements under NRS 51.315 (1) are
not admissible if the statements are testimonial in nature as it is a violation of a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. There is no concrete definition of
what constitutes a “testimonial” statement. Crawford, however, sets out guidelines for
making this determination.

9

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
Id. at 68.
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